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the statute, his action took precedence
over that of the eleven employees. Id, 107
S.Ct. at 2212. The court rejected Fort
Halifax's argument that the Maine statute
was preempted by ERISA, holding that
ERISA preempted only benefit plans created by employers or employee organizations. Since this case involved a benefit
plan which arose by operation of state law,
ERISA did not apply and there was no
preemption problem.
The Supreme Court, while affirming the
judgment of the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court, rejected their rationale. Under the
Maine court's analysis, states could set up
benefit plans because only employers and
employee organizations were barred by
ERISA from doing so. What the Maine
court· failed to recognize, however, was
that such an analysis was in direct conflict
with the Congressional purpose for enacting ERISA. Congress wanted to establish a
uniform set of administrative practices in
dealing with employee benefits, thereby
eliminating conflicting regulatory requirements. By allowing states to set up benefit
plans sua sponte there could still be serious
conflicts between state benefit plans and
benefit plans provided for by ERISA.
Recognizing the fallacy· of the lower
court's reasoning, the Supreme Court took
a different approach. The Court held that
the Maine statute was valid because it neither established, nor required, employers
to maintain an "employee benefit plan" as
that phrase was interpreted by Congress.
In so holding, the Court rejected Fort
Halifax's principle argument that any state
law which deals with an employee benefit
listed in ERISA automatically regulates an
employee benefit plan and is therefore
preempted.
The Court stated three reasons for its
ruling. First, the Court decided that the
plain language of ERISA is contrary to
Fort Halifax's interpretation. The preemption provision of ERISA applies only to
employee benefit plans, not employee benefits. The Maine statute providing for severance pay gave employees a benefit but
did not establish a benefit plan. The Maine
statute requires no regulatory scheme or
administrative programs that could be construed as a "plan." It merely establishes a
one-time payment conditioned upon the
happening of a specific event. Id. at 2213.
Second, the Court analyzed the legislative history and determined that Congress'
principle purpose in enacting ERISA was
to eliminate conflicting state and local
regulations. Id. at 2216. Companies frequently conduct business in many different cities and states, thus making
compliance with state and local regulations
both burdensome and inefficient. Byestab38-The Law Forum/Fal~ 1987

lishing a system of federal regulations to
control benefit plans, Congress hoped to
make it easier for employers to do business
while at the same time protecting the pension and benefit rights of employees.
Examining the Maine statute in light of
ERISA's purposes, it was clear to the
Court that none of the Congressional concerns were present in this case. Id. at 2213.
Finally, the Court noted that another
purpose of ERISA was to mandate disclosure requirements, thus providing safeguards "with respect to the establishment,
operation,
and
administration
of
(employee benefit) plans." 29 U.S.c.
§1001(a) (1982). Since there were no
administrative regulations or continuous
activities involving a "plan" under the
Maine statute, disclosure would be meaningless and safeguards unneccessary.
The Court's decision in Fort Halifax
allows states to provide statutory benefits
to employees as long as they require no
continuous administration constituting a
benefit plan.

- Steven E. Sunday

Emmert v. Hearn: "ALL MY

PERSONAL PROPERTY" CLAUSE
CONSTRUED TO ENCOMPASS
TESTATOR'S TANGmLE AND
INTANGmLE PERSONAL
PROPERTY
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in
Emmert v. Hearn, 309 Md. 19, 522 A.2d
377 (1987), held that a testator's intangible,
as well as tangible, personal property passed to his surviving children under a paragraph in a will that read: "I bequeath all
my personal property to my surviving
children." In so holding, the court of
appeals affirmed the court of special
appeals' reversal of the circuit court ruling.
George Roberts, the testator, died in
1981. He was survived by seven children.
His wife had predeceased him eleven years
prior, and a son had died in 1971, leaving
one child. Roberts left a will (executed in
1977) in which he bequeathed all of his
personal property to his surviving children
to be divided equally.
The estate of George Roberts, at the
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time of his death, was valued at approximately $750,000. Inventories were med
showing $425,000 in real property, $2,500
in tangible personal property and $324,000
in intangible personal property including
stocks, bonds and bank accounts.
Miriam E. Emmert was the designated
personal representative of her father's
estate. In this capacity, she filed a petition
for declaratory relief in the Circuit Court
for Carroll County. The petition alleged,
among other things, that the phrase "personal property was ambiguous; that the
testator's intention was to include only
tangible personal property ... " Emmert '0.
Hearn, 309 Md. at 21, 522 A.2d 377.
The trial court concluded that a latent
ambiguity existed as to whether the "personal property" referred to in the second
provision of Roberts' will included tangible, as well as intangible, personal property. Extrinsic evidence, including testimony
by Emmert, one of the testator's children,
and the deposition by the attorney who
drafted the will, was admitted to "clear the
ambiguity." Id. at 22, 522 A.2d at 379.
From this testimony, it was gleaned that
the intention of the testator was to include
only tangible personal property in his
second provision. The court held that the
words "personal property," as used in the
second provision of his will, applied to tangible property only, and that the intangible personal property passed under
another provision of the will into the inter
vivos trust.
In an unreported opinion, the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the
circuit court judgment. It found that no
ambiguity existed as to the words of the
will; therefore, extrinsic evidence as to the
intention of the testator should not have
been permitted. According to the court of
special appeals, the trial court was in error
in admitting extrinsic evidence of the testator's intention. Certiorari was granted by
the court of appeals to consider the important question presented 307 Md. 163
(1986).
Upon review, the court of appeals
applied a step-by-step analysis in construing the will. Ordinarily, the court said, the
intent of a testator must be gathered from
the four corners of the will, giving words
their "plain meaning." In so doing, the
court recognized that their foremost concern was to ascertain the testator's expressed intent. However, the court stressed that
"[e]xtrinsic evidence should not be admitted to show that the testator meant something different from what his language
imports .. , What he meant to say must be
gathered from what he did say." Id. (quoting Fersinger '0. Martin, 183 Md. 135, 138,
36 A.2d 716 (1944».

The court then looked to Webster's Dictionary, as well as Black's Law Dictionary,
to determine both the ordinary and the
legal meaning of the term "personal property." Both sources included intangible
property in their definitions. Additionally,
the court noted that bequests of personal
property are generally to be construed
broadly unless there is some indication in
the will to the contrary. The court cited
several cases where it had applied this general rule.
In Leroy '0. Kirk, 262 Md. 276, 283, 277
A.2d 611 (1971), for example, the testator
bequeathed "all of my personal property,
including my automobile, boat and the
contents of my house and outbuildings .... " The listing of items put a restriction on the term "personal property" and
caused the court to limit, by example, the
bequest to tangible personal property.
Returning to the Roberts' will, the court
found that nothing on the face of the will
limited or qualified the bequest of personal
property. No examples were given in the
will for the purpose of illustration as to
what the testator meant by personal property. The court concluded that the will
was unambiguous on its face. Furthermore, the court stated that a latent ambiguity did not exist in the provisions of the
Roberts' will. H "the language of the will
is plain and single, yet is found to apply
equally to two or more subjct or objects
then it would indicate latent ambiguity."
Emmert, 309 Md. at 27,522 A.2d 377, 381.
Extrinsic evidence would be admissible
only to resolve an ambiguity. Id. Such
extrinsic evidence might also indicate that
the description in the will is defective.
The court stated that there was no defective description in the will nor was there
any indication that Roberts' bequest
applied to two or more persons or things.
Thus, "if the language of a will is clear
and no latent ambiguity exists, the court's
role in the construction of the will is at an
end." Id. at 28, 522 A.2d at 382. There
being no indication that the testator
intended anything other than all of his personal property to pass under the second
provision, the court held that the bequest
in that paragraph was all-inclusive.
The court cautioned that its holding
would yield an unfair result to the grandchildren, especially to the son of the
deceased child, but such "[A]n inequality
cannot influence a court in its duty to find
out what a testator meant by his will.... "
Emmert, 309 Md. at 28, 522 A.2d 377
. (quoting McCurdy '0. Safe Deposit & Trust
Co., 190 Md. 67, 69, 57 A.2d 302, 303
(1948».
By its holding the court has once more
underscored the important of specificity in

the drafting of legal documents. Drafters
of wills and other testamentary devices
will take note to be as specific as possible
in putting into words the true intentions of
their clients.

- )fargaret Ann Willis
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INSURER BOUND BY VERDICT IN
TORT ACTION AND COULD NOT
RELITIGATE SAME ISSUES AND
OBTAIN AN OVERRIDING
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ON
JURY'S VERDICT
In Allstate Ins. Co. '0. Atwood, 71 Md.
App. 107, 523 A.2d 1066 (1987), the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland held that a
tort-feasor's insurer, which provided
defense for the tort-feasor in an action
brought by the victim, in which the jury
determined that the defendant's striking of
the victim was the result of negligence
rather than battery, was bound by the verdict even though it was not a party to the
suit. As a result, the insurer could not seek
post verdict declaratory relief on the same
issues of fact which has been decided in the
tort-feasor's trial.
This case stems from an incident which
occured in 1983. In an apparently
unprovoked attack, the insured, John
Atwood, struck another youth in the face.
The suit was brought by the victim, individually and through his father, against
Atwood in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The complaint alleged
that the plaintiff's injuries were the result
of either Atwood's negligence or intentional assault and battery.
Atwood, who was living with his
parents at the time of the incident, relied
on their policy with Allstate Insurance
Company. The exclusionary clause pr<r
vided that the insurer is not liable for
"bodily injury ... intentionally caused by
an insured person." Id. at 108, 523 A.2d at
1067.
Before the trial, believing Atwood's
striking of the victim was intentional and
thereby excluded from coverage, Allstate
filed for declaratory relief in 1984. The Bill
was dismissed on the grounds that it was
premature.
At the trial, the jury found that Atwood
was negligent which prevented the defendant's conduct from coming within the
policy's exclusion regarding intentional
conduct. Despite the jury's finding of
negligence, Allstate filed for a Bill of
Declaratory Relief on the ground that the
. injuries sustained by the plaintiff "were a
direct result ... of (Atwood's) intentional
Fal~
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